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Abstract—In two-player repeated games, Zero-Determinant
(ZD) strategies are a class of strategies that can enable a player
to unilaterally enforce a linear payoff relation between her
own and her opponent’s payoff irrespective of the opponent’s
strategy. This manipulative nature of the ZD strategies attracted
significant attention from researchers due to its close connection
to controlling distributively the outcome of evolutionary games
in large populations. In this paper, we study the existence of
ZD strategies in repeated n-player games with a finite but
undetermined time horizon. Necessary and sufficient conditions
are derived for a linear relation to be enforceable by a ZD
strategist in n-player social dilemmas, in which the expected
number of rounds can be captured by a fixed and common
discount factor (0 < δ < 1). Thresholds exist for such a discount
factor above which generous, extortionate and equalizer payoff
relations can be enforced. For the first time in the studies of
repeated games, ZD strategies are examined in the setting of
finitely repeated n-player, two-action games. Our results show
that depending on the group size and the ZD-strategist’s initial
probability to cooperate, for finitely repeated n-player social
dilemmas, it is possible for extortionate, generous and equalizer
ZD-strategies to exist. The threshold discount factors rely on
the slope and baseline payoff of the desired linear relation and
the variation in the “one-shot” payoffs of the n-player game. To
show the utility of our general results, we apply them to a linear
n-player public goods game.
Index Terms—Game theory, n-player games, repeated games,
zero-determinant strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE functionalities of many complex social systems relyon their composing individuals’ willingness to set aside
their personal interest for the benefit of the greater good [12].
One mechanism for the evolution of cooperation is known
as direct reciprocity: even if in the short run it pays off
to be selfish, mutual cooperation can be favoured when the
individuals encounter each other repeatedly. Direct reciprocity
is often studied in the standard model of repeated games and
it is only recently, inspired by the discovery of a novel class
of strategies, called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [14], that
repeated games began to be examined from a new angle by
investigating the level of control that a single player can
exert on the average payoffs of its opponent. In [14] Press
and Dyson showed that in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 prisoners
dilemma games, if a player can remember the actions in
the previous round, this player can unilaterally impose some
linear relation between its own expected payoff and that of its
opponent. It is emphasized that this enforced linear relation
cannot be avoided even if the opponent employs some intricate
strategy with a large memories. Such strategies are called
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zero-determinant because they enforce a part of the transition
matrix to have a determinant that is equal to zero. Later, ZD
strategies were extended to games with more than two possible
actions [15], continuous action spaces [11], and alternative
moves [10]. The success of ZD strategies in an evolutionary
setting was examined in [16], [3]. For a given population size,
in the limit of weak selection it was shown in [17] that all
ZD strategies that can survive an invasion of any memory-
one strategy must be “generous”, namely enforcing a linear
payoff relation that favors others. This surprising fact was
tested experimentally in [4]. Most of the literature focuses
on two-player games; however, in [13] the existence of ZD-
startegies in infinitely repeated public goods games was shown
by extending the arguments in [14] to a symmetric public
goods game. Around the same time, characterization of the
feasible ZD strategies in multiplayer social dilemmas and
those strategies that maintain cooperation in such n-player
games were reported in [6]. Both in [13] and [6] it was
noted that group size n imposes restrictive conditions on the
set of feasible ZD strategies and that alliances between co-
players can overcome this restrictive effect of the group size.
The evolutionary success of ZD strategies in such n-player
games was studied in [7] and the results show that sustaining
large scale cooperation requires the formation of alliances. ZD
strategies for finitely repeated 2 × 2 games with discounted
payoffs were defined and characterized in [5]. The threshold
discount factors above which the ZD strategy can exist were
derived in [8]. In this paper we use the framework of ZD
strategies in infinitely repeated multiplayer social dilemmas
from [6] and extend it to the finitely repeated case in which
future payoffs are discounted. We build upon our results in
[2], in which enforceable payoff relations were characterized,
by developing new theory that allows us to express threshold
discount factors that determine how fast a strategic player can
enforce a desired linear payoff relation. These general results
are applicable to multiplayer and two player games and can
be applied to a variety of complex social dilemma settings
including the famous prisoner’s dilemma, the public goods
game, the volunteer’s dilemma, the n-player snowdrift game
and much more. These additional results can be also be used
to determine ones possibilities for exerting control given a
constraint on the expected number of interactions, and thus
provide novel insights for one’s level of influence in real-
world repeated interactions. The results in this paper can be
used to investigate, both analytically and experimentally, the
effect of the group size and the initial condition on the level
of control that a single player can exert in finitely repeated
n-player social dilemma games. Thus, our results may open
the door for novel control techniques that seek to achieve or
sustain cooperation in large social systems that evolve under
evolutionary forces. The paper is organized as follows. In
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section II, preliminaries are given concerning the necessary
notations and the considered game model with underlying
assumptions. Furthermore, memory-one strategies are formally
defined. In section III, the mean distribution of the finitely
repeated n-player game and the relation to the memory-one
strategy is given. In section IV, ZD strategies for finitely
repeated n-player games are defined, and in section V the
enforceable payoff relations are characterized. In section VI,
threshold discount factors are given for generous, extortionate
and equalizer ZD strategies. In Section VII, we provide the
proofs of our main results. We apply our results to the n-
player linear public goods game in Section VIII, and conclude
the paper in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
For some vector v ∈ Rn we denote its ith element by
vi. To emphasize v is obtained by stacking its elements vi
we sometimes write v = (vi) ∈ Rn. For a pair of vectors
w, u ∈ Rn, w · v = ∑ni=1 wivi is the dot product. We denote
the 2n×1 column vector of all ones by 12n ∈ R2n. Likewise,
02n ∈ R2n is the column vector of all zeros. When the
dimensions are disregarded, 1 and 0 are always 2n×1 column
vectors. We denote the n-ary Cartesian product over the sets
M1,M2, . . .Mn by ×ni=1Mi.
B. Symmetric n-player games
In this paper we consider n-player games in which players
can repeatedly choose to either cooperate or defect. The set
of actions for each player is denoted by A = {C,D}. The
actions chosen in the group in round t of the repeated game is
described by an action profile σt ∈ A = {C,D}n. A player’s
payoff in a given round depends on the player’s own action
and the actions of the n−1 co-players. In a group in which z
co-players cooperate, a cooperator receives payoff az , whereas
a defector receives bz . As in [6], [13] we assume the game is
symmetric, such that the outcome of the game depends only on
one’s own decision and the number of cooperating co-players,
and hence does not depend on which of the co-players have
cooperated. Accordingly, the payoffs of all possible outcomes
for a player can be conveniently summarized in table I.
Number of cooperators
among co-players n− 1 n− 2 . . . 2 1 0
Cooperator’s payoff an−1 an−2 . . . a2 a1 a0
Defector’s payoff bn−1 bn−2 . . . b2 b1 b0
TABLE I: Payoffs of the symmetric n-player games. A
player’s payoff depends on its own decision and the number
of co-players who cooperate.
We have the following assumptions on the payoffs of the
symmetric n-player game.
Assumption 1 (Social dilemma assumption [6], [9]). The
payoffs of the symmetric n-player game satisfy the following
conditions:
For all 0 ≤ z < n − 1, it holds that az+1 ≥ az and
bz+1 ≥ bz .
a)
For all 0 ≤ z < n− 1, it holds that bz+1 > az .b)
an−1 > b0.c)
Assumption 1 is standard in n-player social dilemma games
and it ensures that there is a conflict between the interest
of each individual and that of the group as a whole. Thus,
those games whose payoffs satisfy Assumption 1 can model a
social dilemma that results from selfish behaviors in a group.
Consider the following examples.
Example 1. As an example of a game that satisfies Assumption
1, consider a public goods game in which each cooperator
contributes an amount c > 0 to a public good. The sum of the
contributions get multiplied by an enhancement factor 1 <
r < n and then divided evenly among all group members.
This results in the following payoffs:
az =
rc(z + 1)
n
− c, bz = rcz
n
, for z = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Example 2 (n-player stag hunt game). In the public goods
of Example 1, a single player can create a benefit. In some
other social dilemma games only a group of cooperators can
create a benefit. For example, in the n-player stag hunt game,
players obtain the benefit b if and only if all players cooperate
[18]. This results in the following payoffs,
bz = 0, for all 0 ≤ z ≤ n− 1,
az =
{
b− c, if z = n− 1;
−c, otherwise.
C. Strategies
In repeated games the players must choose how to update
their actions as the game interactions are repeated over rounds.
A strategy of a player determines the conditional probabilities
with which actions are chosen by the player. To formalize this
concept we introduce some additional notation. A history of
plays up to round t is denoted by ht = (σ0, σ1, . . . , σt−1) ∈
At such that each σk ∈ A for all k = 0 . . . t−1. The union of
possible histories is denoted by H = ∪∞t=0At, with A0 = ∅
being the empty set. Finally, let ∆(A) denote the probability
distribution over the action set A. As is standard in the theory
of repeated games, a strategy of player i is then defined by a
function ρ : H → ∆(A) that maps the history of play to the
probability distribution over the action set. An interesting and
important subclass of strategies are those that only take into
account the action profile in round t − 1, (i.e. σt−1 ∈ ht) to
determine the conditional probabilities to choose some action
in round t + 1. Correspondingly these strategies are called
memory-one strategies and are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Memory-one strategy, [5]). A strategy ρ is a
memory-one strategy if ρ(ht) = ρ(hˆt
′
) for all histories ht =
(σ0, . . . , σt−1) and hˆt
′
= (σˆ0, . . . , σˆt
′−1) with t, t′ ≥ 1 and
σt−1 = σˆt
′−1.
The theory of Press and Dyson showed that, for determining
the best performing strategies in terms of expected payoffs in
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two-action repeated games, it is sufficient to consider only the
space of memory-one strategies [14], [15].
III. MEAN DISTRIBUTIONS OF MEMORY-ONE STRATEGIES
IN FINITELY REPEATED n-PLAYER GAMES
In this section we zoom in on a particular player that
employs a memory-one strategy in the n-player game and refer
to this player as the key player. In particular, we focus on the
relation between the mean distribution of action profiles and
the memory-one strategy of the key player. Let px,z ∈ [0, 1]
denote the probability that the key player cooperates in round
t+1 given that, in round t, the player plays x ∈ {C,D} and z
of the co-players cooperate. By stacking these probabilities for
all 2n possible outcomes into a vector, we obtain the memory-
one strategy that determines the probability for the key player
to cooperate in round t+ 1:
p = (pC,n−1, . . . , pC,0, pD,n−1, . . . , pD,0) ∈ [0, 1]2n,
where we have used the convention to order the conditional
probabilities based on the key player’s decision and a de-
scending number of cooperating co-players. Accordingly, the
memory-one strategy pRep = (1n,0n), gives the probability
to cooperate when the current action is simply repeated. That
is, when the key player cooperates in round t, by employing
pRep she will cooperate in round t+1 with probability one. Let
vx,z(t) denote the probability that the outcome of round t is
(x, z) ∈ A, with x ∈ {C,D}. And let v(t) = (vx,z(t)) ∈ R2n
be the vector of outcome probabilities in round t. As in [5],
[8], [11], [10] we focus on finitely repeated games. The finite
number of rounds is determined by a fixed and common
discount factor 0 < δ < 1 that, given the current round,
determines the probability that a next round takes place. By
taking the limit of the geometric sum of δ, the expected
number of rounds is 11−δ . As in [5], the mean distribution
of v(t) is:
v = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtv(t). (1)
In this paper we are interested in the average discounted
payoffs of the finitely repeated n-player game. Let gix,z denote
the payoff in a given round that player i receives by choosing
x ∈ A and z of its co-players cooperated. By stacking the
possible payoffs we obtain the vector gi = (gix,z) ∈ R2n
that contains all possible payoffs in a given round of player
i. The expected “one-shot” payoff of player i in round t is
pii(t) = giv(t). And the average discounted payoff in the
finitely repeated game for player i is then:
pii = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtpii(t) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtgi · v(t) = gi · v.
The following lemma relates the limit distribution v of the
finitely repeated game to the memory-one strategy p of the
key player. The presented lemma is a straightforward n-player
extension of the 2-player case that is given in [5] and relies
on the fundamental results from [1].
Lemma 1 (Limit distribution). Suppose the key player applies
memory-one strategy p and the strategies of the other players
are arbitrary, but fixed. For the finitely repeated n-player
game, it holds that
(δp− pRep) · v = −(1− δ)p0,
where p0 is the key player’s initial probability to cooperate.
Proof: The probability that i cooperated in round t is
qC(t) = p
Rep · v(t). And the probability that i cooperates in
round t+ 1 is qC(t+ 1) = p · v(t). Now define,
u(t) := δqC(t+ 1)− qC(t) = (δp− pRep) · v(t). (2)
Multiplying equation (2) by (1 − δ)δt and summing up over
t = 0, . . . , τ we obtain
(1− δ)
τ∑
t=0
δtu(t) =
(1− δ)(δqc(1)− qc(0) + δ2qc(2)− δqc(1)+
· · ·+ δτ+1qc(τ + 1)− δτqc(τ)
= (1− δ)δτ+1qc(τ + 1)− (1− δ)qc(0).
Because 0 < δ < 1, it follows that
lim
τ→∞(1− δ)
τ∑
t=0
δtu(t) = −(1− δ)p0.
And by the definition of v in equation (1):
lim
τ→∞(1− δ)
τ∑
t=0
δt(δp− pRep) · v(t) = (δp− pRep) · v.
By substituting u(t) back into the equation we obtain
(δp− pRep) · v = −(1− δ)p0.
This completes the proof.
Remark 1. Note that in the limit δ → 1, the infinitely repeated
game is recovered. In this setting, the expected number of
rounds is infinite. And, if the limit exists, the average payoffs
are given by
pii = lim
τ→∞
1
τ + 1
τ∑
t=0
pii(t).
By Akins Lemma (see [1], [6]), for the infinitely repeated game
irrespective of the initial probability to cooperate, it holds that
(p− pRep) · v = 0.
Hence, a key difference between the infinitely repeated and
finitely repeated game is that p0 is important for the relation
between the memory-one strategy p and the mean distribution
v when the game is repeated a finite number of expected
rounds. When the game is infinitely repeated, i.e. δ → 1, the
importance of the initial conditions on the relation between p
and v disappears [6].
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IV. ZD-STRATEGIES IN FINITELY REPEATED n-PLAYER
GAMES
Based on Lemma 1 we now formally define a ZD strategy
for a finitely repeated n-player game.
Definition 2. A memory-one strategy p is a ZD-strategy for
an n-player game if there exist constants α, βj , γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
with
∑n
j 6=i βj 6= 0 such that
δp = pRep + αgi +
n∑
j 6=i
βjg
j + (γ − (1− δ)p0)1. (3)
The following proposition shows how the ZD strategy can
enforce a linear relation between the key players expected
payoff and that of her co-players.
Proposition 1. Suppose the key player employs a fixed ZD
strategy with parameters α, βj and γ as in definition 2. Then,
irrespective of the fixed strategies of the remaining n− 1 co-
players, the payoffs obey the equation
αpii +
n∑
j 6=i
βjpi
j + γ = 0. (4)
Proof:
(δp− pRep) = αgi +
n∑
j 6=i
βjg
j + (γ − (1− δ)p0)1
(δp− pRep) · v = αpii +
n∑
j 6=i
βjpi
j + γ − (1− δ)p0
(δp− pRep) · v + (1− δ)p0 = αpii +
n∑
j 6=i
βjpi
j + γ
0 = αpii +
n∑
j 6=i
βjpi
j + γ.
(5)
To be consistent with the earlier work on ZD startegies in
infinitely repeated n-player games in [6], we introduce the
parameter transformations:
l =
−γ
(α+
∑n
k 6=i βk)
, s =
−α∑n
k 6=i βk
,
wj 6=i =
βj∑n
k 6=i βk
, φ = −
n∑
k 6=i
βk, wi = 0.
Using these parameter transformations, equation (3) can be
written as
δp = prep + φ
sgi − n∑
j 6=i
wjg
j + (1− s)l1
− (1− δ)p01,
(6)
under the conditions that φ 6= 0, wi = 0 and
∑n
j=1 wj = 1.
Moreover, the linear payoff relation in equation (4) becomes
pi−i = spii + (1− s)l,
where pi−i =
∑n
j 6=i wjpi
j . The four most widely studied ZD
strategies are given in Table II.
TABLE II: The four mostly studied ZD strategies. Depending
on the parameter values s and l, players may be fair, generous,
extortionate or equalizers.
ZD-Strategy Parameter values Enforced payoff relation
Fair s = 1 pi−i = pii
Generous l = an−1, 0 < s < 1 pi−i ≥ pii
Extortionate l = b0, 0 < s < 1 pi−i ≤ pii
Equalizer s = 0 pi−i = l
Because the entries of the ZD-strategy correspond to con-
ditional probabilities, they are required to belong to the unit
interval. Hence, not every linear payoff relation with param-
eters s, l is valid. Let w = (wi) ∈ Rn−1 denote the vector
of weigths that the ZD strategist assigns to her co-players.
Consider the following definition that was given in [5] for
two-player games.
Definition 3 (Enforceable payoff relations). Given a discount
factor 0 < δ < 1, a payoff relation (s, l) ∈ R2 with weights
w is enforceable if there are φ ∈ R and p0 ∈ [0, 1], such
that each entry in p according to equation (3) is in [0, 1]. We
indicate the set of enforceable payoff relations by Eδ .
An intuitive implication of decreasing the expected number
of rounds in the repeated game (e.g. by decreasing δ) is that the
set of enforceable payoff relations will decrease as well. This
monotone effect is formalized in the following proposition that
extends a result from [5] to the n-player case.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity of Eδ). If δ′ ≤ δ′′, then Eδ′ ≤
Eδ′′ .
Proof: Albeit with different formulations of the p, the
proof follows from the same argument used in the the two-
player case [6]. It is presented here to make the paper self-
contained. From Definition 3, (s, l) ∈ Eδ if and only if one
can find φ ∈ R and p0 ∈ [0, 1] such that p ∈ [0, 1]n. We have
0 ≤ p ≤ 1⇒ 0 ≤ δp ≤ δ1. (7)
Then by substituting (3) into the above inequality we obtain,
p0(1− δ)1 ≤ p∞ ≤ δ1+ (1− δ)p01, (8)
with
p∞ = prep + φ
sgi − n∑
j 6=i
wjg
j + (1− s)l1
 .
Now observe that p0(1 − δ)1 on the left-hand side of the
inequality (8) is decreasing for increasing δ. Moreover, δ1 +
(1−δ)p01 on the right-hand side of the inequality is increasing
for increasing δ. The middle part of the inequality, which
is exactly the definition of a ZD strategy for the infinitely
repeated game in [6], is independent of δ. It follows that by
increasing δ the range of possible ZD parameters (s, l, φ) and
p0 increases and hence if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is satisfied for some δ′,
then it is also satisfied for some δ′′ ≥ δ′.
Now we are ready to state the existence problem studied in
this paper.
4
Problem 1 (The existence problem). For the class of n-player
games with payoffs as in Table I that satisfy Assumption 1,
what are the enforceable payoff relations when the expected
number of rounds is finite, i.e., δ ∈ (0, 1)?
V. EXISTENCE OF ZD STRATEGIES
In this section, we present our main results on the existence
problem. The proofs of these results are found in Section VII.
We begin by formulating conditions on the parameters of the
ZD strategy that are necessary for the payoff relation to be
enforceable in the finitely repeated n-player game.
Proposition 3. The enforceable payoff relations (l, s, w) for
the finitely repeated n-player game with 0 < δ < 1, with
payoffs as in table I that satisfy Assumption 1, require the
following necessary conditions:
− 1
n− 1 ≤ −minj 6=i wj < s < 1,
φ > 0,
b0 ≤ l ≤ an−1, (9)
with at least one strict inequality in (9).
Because fair strategies are defined with the slope s = 1
(see, Table II), an immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For the finitely repeated n-player social dilemma
game with payoffs that satisfy Assumption 1 there do not exist
fair ZD strategies.
In the following theorem we extend the results for infinitely
repeated n-player games from [6] to finitely repeated games.
To write the statement compactly, we let a−1 = bn = 0.
Moreover, let wˆz = min
wh∈w
(
∑z
h=1 wh) denote the sum of the z
smallest weights and let wˆ0 = 0.
Theorem 1. For the finitely repeated n-player game with
payoffs as in Table I that satisfy Assumption 1, the payoff
relation (s, l) ∈ R2 with weights w ∈ Rn−1 is enforceable if
and only if − 1n−1 < s < 1 and
max
0≤z≤n−1
{
bz − wˆz(bz − az−1)
(1− s)
}
≤ l,
min
0≤z≤n−1
{
az +
wˆn−z−1(bz+1 − az)
(1− s)
}
≥ l,
(10)
moreover, at least one inequality in (10) is strict.
Remark 2. For n = 2 the full weight is placed on the single
opponent i.e., wˆj = 1. When the payoff parameters are defined
as b1 = T , b0 = P , a1 = R, a0 = S, the result in Theorem
1 recovers the earlier result obtained for the finitely repeated
2-player game in [5].
Theorem 1 does not stipulate any conditions on the key
player’s initial probability to cooperate other than p0 ∈ [0, 1].
However, the existence of extortionate and generous strategies
does depend on the value of p0. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. For the existence of extortionate strategies it is
necessary that p0 = 0. Moreover, for the existence of generous
ZD strategies it is necessary that p0 = 1.
These requirements on the key player’s initial probability to
cooperate make intuitive sense. In a finitely repeated game, if
the key player aims to be an extortioner that profits from the
cooperative actions of others, she cannot start to cooperate
because she could be taken advantage off by defectors. On
the other hand, if she aims to be generous, she cannot start
as a defector because this will punish both cooperating and
defecting co-players.
VI. THRESHOLDS ON DISCOUNT FACTORS
In the previous section we have characterized the enforce-
able payoff relations of ZD strategies in finitely repeated
n-player social dilemma games. Our conditions generalize
those obtained for two-player games and illustrate how a
single player can exert control over the outcome of an n-
player repeated game with a finite number of expected rounds.
The conditions that result from the existence problem do
not specify requirements on the discount factor other than
δ ∈ (0, 1). In practice, one could be interested in how long
it would take to enforce some desired payoff relation. In this
section we address this problem.
Problem 2 (The minimum threshold problem). Suppose the
desired payoff relation (s, l) ∈ R2 satisfies the conditions in
Theorem 1. What is the minimum δ ∈ (0, 1) under which the
linear relation (s, l) with weights w can be enforced by the
ZD strategist?
We consider the three classes of ZD strategies separately.
Before giving the main results it is necessary to introduce
some additional notation. Define w˜z = max
wh∈w
∑z
h=1 wh to be
the maximum sum of weights for some permutation of σ ∈ A
with z cooperating co-players. Additionally, for some given
payoff relation (s, l) ∈ R2 and w ∈ Rn−1 define
ρC := max
0≤z≤n−1
(1− s)(az − l) + w˜n−z−1(bz+1 − az),
ρC := min
0≤z≤n−1
(1− s)(az − l) + wˆn−z−1(bz+1 − az),
ρD := max
0≤z≤n−1
(1− s)(l − bz) + w˜z(bz − az−1),
ρD := min
0≤z≤n−1
(1− s)(l − bz) + wˆz(bz − az−1). (11)
In the following, we will use these extrema to derive thresh-
old discount factors for extortionate, generous and equalizer
strategies in symmetric n-player social dilemma games. The
proofs of our results can be found in Section VII.
A. Extortionate ZD strategies
We first consider the case in which l = b0 and 0 < s < 1,
such that the ZD strategy is extortionate. We have the follow-
ing result.
Theorem 2. Assume p0 = 0 and (s, b0) ∈ R2 satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 1, then ρC > 0 and ρD + ρC > 0.
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Moreover, the threshold discount factor above which extor-
tionate ZD strategies exist is determined by
δτ = max
{
ρC − ρC
ρC
,
ρD
ρD + ρC
}
.
B. Generous ZD strategies
If a player instead aims to be generous, in general, different
thresholds will apply. Thus, we now consider the case in which
l = an−1 and 0 < s < 1 such that the ZD strategy is generous.
Theorem 3. Assume p0 = 1 and (s, an−1) ∈ R2 satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 1. Then ρD > 0 and ρC + ρD > 0.
Moreover, the threshold discount factor above which generous
ZD strategies exist is determined by
δτ = max
{
ρD − ρD
ρD
,
ρC
ρC + ρD
}
.
C. Equalizer ZD strategies
The existence of equalizer strategies with s = 0 does not
impose any requirement on the initial probability to cooperate.
In general, one can identify different regions of the unit
interval for p0 in which different threshold discount factors
exist. For instance, the boundary cases can be examined in
a similar manner as was done for extortionate and generous
strategies and, in general, will lead to different requirements
on the discount factor. In this section, we derive conditions
for the discount factor such that the equalizer payoff relation
can be enforced for a variable initial probability to cooperate
that is within the open unit interval.
Theorem 4. Suppose s = 0 and l satisfies the bounds in
Theorem 1. Then, the equalizer payoff relation can be enforced
for p0 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if the following inequalities hold
δ ≥ 1− ρ
D
ρD + (ρD − ρD)p0
, (12)
δ ≥ 1− ρ
C
(1− p0)(ρC + ρD)
, (13)
δ ≥ 1− ρ
C
(1− p0)(ρC − ρC) + ρC
, (14)
δ ≥ 1− ρ
D(
ρC + ρD
)
p0
. (15)
Based on Theorem 4, the following corollary provides
relatively easy to check sufficient conditions that allow an
equalizer strategy to enforce a desired linear relation for
every initial probability to cooperate in the open unit interval.
These sufficient conditions link thresholds for generous and
extortionate strategies to those of equalizer strategies.
Corollary 2. Suppose s = 0 and l satisfies the bounds in
Theorem 1. Then, the equalizer payoff relation can be enforced
for all p0 ∈ (0, 1) if
δ ≥ δτ = max
{
ρC − ρC
ρC
,
ρD − ρD
ρD
,
ρD
ρC + ρD
,
ρC
ρC + ρD
}
.
Proof. The sufficient conditions are obtained by solving the
conditions in Theorem 4, that are linear in p0, for the smallest
upper-bounds on the discount factor δ. 
With Theorems 2, 3, and 4, we have provided expressions
for deriving the minimum discount factor for some desired
linear relation. Because the expressions depend on the “one-
shot” payoff of the n-player game, in general they will
differ between social dilemmas. In order to determine these
expressions, one needs to find the global extrema of a function
over z that can be efficiently done for a large class of social
dilemma games. The derived thresholds can, for example, be
used as an indicator for a minimum number of rounds in a
experiments on extortion and generosity in repeated games or
simply as an indicator for how many expected interactions a
single ZD strategists requires to enforce some desired payoff
relation in a group of decision makers.
VII. PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose all players are cooperating e.g. σ = (C,C, . . . , C).
Then from the definition of δp in equation (6) and the payoffs
given in Table I, it follows that
δp(C,C,...,C) = 1 + φ(1− s)(l − an−1)− (1− δ)p0. (16)
Now suppose that all players are defecting. Similarly, we have
δp(D,D,...,D) = φ(1− s)(l − b0)− (1− δ)p0. (17)
In order for these payoff relations to be enforceable, it needs
to hold that both entries in equations (16) and (17) are in the
interval [0, δ]. Equivalently,
(1− δ)(1− p0) ≤ φ(1− s)(an−1− l) ≤ 1− (1− δ)p0, (18)
and
0 ≤ p0(1− δ) ≤ φ(1− s)(l − b0) ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0 (19)
Combining (18) and (19) it follows that 0 < (1− δ) ≤ φ(1−
s)(an−1 − b0). From the assumption that an−1 > b0 listed in
Assumption 1, it follows that
0 < φ(1− s). (20)
Now suppose there is a single defecting player, i.e., σ =
(C,C, . . . ,D) or any of its permutations. In this case, the
entries of the memory-one strategy are as given in equation
(21). Again, for both cases we require δpσ to be in the interval
[0, δ]. This results in the inequalities given in equations (22)
and (23).
By combining the equations (22) and (23) we obtain
0 < (1− δ) ≤ φ(s+ wj)(bn−1 − an−2). (24)
Again, because of the assumption bz+1 > az it follows that
0 < φ(s+ wj), ∀j 6= i. (25)
The inequalities (25) and (20) together imply that
0 < φ(1 + wj),∀j 6= i. (26)
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δpσ =
{
1 + φ[san−2 − (1− wj)an−2 − wjbn−1 + (1− s)l]− (1− δ)p0, if defector is j 6= i;
φ[sbn−1 − an−2 + (1− s)l]− (1− δ)p0, if defector is i.
(21)
0 ≤ p0(1− δ) ≤ φ[sbn−1 − an−2 + (1− s)l] ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0 (22)
(1− δ)(1− p0) ≤ φ[−san−2 + (1− wj)an−2 + wjbn−1 − (1− s)l] ≤ 1− p0(1− δ) (23)
Because at least one wj > 0, it follows that
φ > 0. (27)
Combining with equation (20) we obtain
s < 1. (28)
In combination with equation (26) it follows that
∀j 6= i : s+ wj > 0⇔ ∀j 6= i : wj > −s⇔ min
j 6=i
wj > −s.
(29)
The inequalities in the equations (28) and (29) finally
produce the bounds on s:
−min
j 6=i
wj < s < 1 (30)
Moreover, because it is required that
∑n
j=1 wj = 1, it
follows that min
j 6=i
wj ≤ 1n−1 . Hence the necessary condition
turns into:
− 1
n− 1 ≤ −minj 6=i wj < s < 1. (31)
We continue to show the necessary upper and lower bound
on l. From equation (18) we obtain:
φ(1− s)(l − an−1) ≤ (1− p0)(δ − 1) ≤ 0. (32)
From equation (20) we know φ(1− s) > 0. Together with
equation (32) this implies the necessary condition
l − an−1 ≤ 0⇔ l ≤ an−1. (33)
We continue with investigating the lower-bound on l, from
equation (19)
0 ≤ p0(1− δ) ≤ φ(1− s)(l − b0) ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0. (34)
Because φ(1− s) > 0 (see equation (20)) it follows that
l ≥ b0.
Naturally, when l = an−1 by assumption 1 it holds that l > b0
and when l = b0 then l < an−1. 
B. Proof of Proposition 4
For brevity, in the following proof we refer to equations
that are found in the proof of Proposition 3. Assume the ZD
strategy is extortionate, hence l = b0. From the lower bound
in (19) in order for l to be enforceable, it is necessary that
p0 = 0. This proves the first statement. Now assume the ZD
strategy is generous, hence l = an−1. From the lower bound
in (18) in order for l to be enforceable, it is necessary that
p0 = 1. This proves the second statement and completes the
proof. 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
In the following we refer to the key player, who is employ-
ing the ZD strategy, as player i. Let σ = (x1, . . . , xn) such
that xk ∈ A and let σC be the number of i′s co-players that
cooperate and let σD = n − 1 − σC , be the number of i′s
co-players that defect. Also, let |σ| be the total number of
cooperators including player i. Using this notation, for some
action profile σ we may write the ZD strategy as
δpσ = p
Rep+φ[(1−s)(l−giσ)+
n∑
j 6=i
wj(g
i
σ−gjσ)]−(1−δ)p0.
(35)
Also, note that
n∑
j 6=i
wjg
j
σ =
∑
k∈σD
wkg
k
σ +
∑
h∈σC
whg
h
σ , (36)
and because
∑n
j 6=i wj = 1 it holds that∑
l∈σC
wl = 1−
∑
k∈σD
wk.
Substituting this into equation (36) and using the payoffs as
in Table I we obtain
n∑
j 6=i
wjg
j
σ = a|σ|−1 +
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1).
Accordingly, the entries of the ZD strategy δpσ are given by
equation (38). For all σ ∈ A we require that
0 ≤ δpσ ≤ δ. (37)
This leads to the inequalities in equations (39) and (40).
Because φ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, the inequalities
in equation (39) can be satisfied for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and
p0 ∈ [0, 1] if and only if for all σ such that xi = C the
inequalities in equation (41) are satisfied.
0 ≤ (1− s)(a|σ|−1 − l) +
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1). (41)
The inequality (41) together with the necessary condition s <
1 (see Proposition 3) implies that
a|σ|−1 +
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) ≥ l, (42)
and thus provides an upper-bound on the enforceable baseline
payoff l. We now turn our attention to the inequalities in
7
δpσ =

1 + φ
[
(1− s)(l − a|σ|−1)−
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
]
− (1− δ)p0, if xi = C,
φ
[
(1− s)(l − b|σ|) +
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
]
− (1− δ)p0, if xi = D.
(38)
0 ≤ (1− δ)(1− p0) ≤ φ
(1− s)(a|σ|−1 − l) + ∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
 ≤ 1− (1− δ)p0 (39)
0 ≤ (1− δ)p0 ≤ φ
(1− s)(l − b|σ|) + ∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
 ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0. (40)
equation (40) that can be satisfied if and only if for all σ
such that xi = D the following holds
0 ≤ (1− s)(l − b|σ|) +
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1−s)>0
=====⇒ b|σ| −
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) ≤ l.
(43)
Combining equations (43) and (42) we obtain
max
|σ|s.t.xi=D
b|σ| −
∑
l∈σC
wl(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s)
 ≤ l,
l ≤ min
|σ|s.t.xi=C
a|σ|−1 +
∑
k∈σD
wk(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s)
 .
(44)
Because b|σ| − a|σ|−1 > 0 and (1 − s) > 0 the minima
and maxima of the bounds in equation (44) are achieved by
choosing the wj as small as possible. That is, the extrema of
the bounds on l are achieved for those states σ|xi=D in which∑
l∈σC
wl is minimum and those σ|xi=C in which
∑
k∈σD
wk is
minimum. Let wˆz = min
wh∈w
(
∑z
h=1 wh) denote the sum of the
j smallest weights and let wˆ0 = 0. By the above reasoning,
equation (44) can be equivalently written as in the theorem in
the main text. Now, suppose we have a non-strict upper-bound
on the base-level payoff, i.e.,
l = a|σ|−1 +
∑
k∈σD
wk(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) .
Then from equation (39) it follows that p0 = 1 is required.
Then equation (40) implies
0 < (1− s)(l − b|σ|) +
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1−s)>0
=====⇒ b|σ| −
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) < l.
(45)
Which is exactly the corresponding lower-bound of l, that is
thus required to be strict when the upper-bound is non-strict.
Now suppose we have a non-strict lower bound, e.g.
l = b|σ| −
∑
l∈σC
wl(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) .
From equation (40) it follows that p0 = 0 is required. Then,
the inequalities in equation (39) require that
0 < (1− s)(a|σ|−1 − l) +
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1−s)>0
=====⇒ a|σ|−1 +
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ| − a|σ|−1)
(1− s) > l.
(46)
This completes the proof. 
D. Proof of Theorem 2
For brevity in the following proof we refer to equations that
can be found in the proof of Theorem 1. From Proposition 4
we know that in order for the extortionate payoff relation to
be enforceable it is necessary that p0 = 0. By substituting
this into equation (39) it follows that in order for the payoff
relation to be enforceable it is required that for all σ such that
xi = C the following holds:
ρC(σ) = (1−s)(a|σ|−1−l)+
∑
j∈σD
wj(b|σ|−a|σ|−1) > 0. (47)
Hence, Equation (39) with p0 = 0 implies that for all σ such
that xi = C it holds that
1− δ
ρC(σ)
≤ φ ≤ 1
ρC(σ)
⇒ 1− δ
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ φ ≤ 1
ρC(z, w˜z)
.
(48)
Naturally, ρC ≥ ρC . In the special case in which equality
holds, it follows from equation (48) that δ ≥ 0, which is true
by definition of δ. We continue to investigate the case in which
ρC > ρC . In this case, a solution to equation (48) for some
φ > 0 exists if and only if
1− δ
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ 1
ρC(z, w˜z)
⇒ δ ≥ ρ
C − ρC
ρC
, (49)
which leads to the first expression in the theorem. Now, from
equation (40) with p0 = 0, it follows that in order for the
payoff relation to be enforceable it is necessary that
∀σ s.t. xi = D : 0 ≤ φρD(σ) ≤ δ ⇒ 0 ≤ φρD(z, w˜z) ≤ δ.
(50)
8
Because φ > 0 is necessary for the payoff relation to be
enforceable, it follows that ρD(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ such that
xi = D. Let us first investigate the special case in which
ρD(z, w˜z) = 0. Then (50) is satisfied for any φ > 0 and
δ ∈ (0, 1). Now, assume ρD(z, w˜z) > 0. Then, equations (50)
and (48) imply
1− δ
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ φ ≤ δ
ρD(z, w˜z)
. (51)
In order for such a φ to exist it needs to hold that
1− δ
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ δ
ρD(z, w˜z)
ρD, ρC>0
======⇒ δ ≥ ρ
D
ρD + ρC
. (52)
This completes the proof. 
E. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is similar to the extortionate case in the proof of
Theorem 2. From Proposition 4 we know that in order for the
generous payoff relation to be enforceable it is necessary that
p0 = 1. By substituting this into equation (40) it follows that
in order for the payoff relation to be enforceable it is required
that for all σ such that xi = D the following holds:
ρD(σ) = (1− s)(l − b|σ|) +
∑
j∈σC
wj(b|σ|−a|σ|−1) > 0. (53)
Hence, equation (40) with p0 = 1 implies that for all σ such
that xi = D it holds that
1− δ
ρD(σ)
≤ φ ≤ 1
ρD(σ)
⇒ 1− δ
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ φ ≤ 1
ρD(z, w˜z)
.
(54)
If ρD = ρD > 0 this implies δ ≥ 0. Otherwise equation (54)
implies that
1− δ
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ 1
ρD(z, w˜z)
⇒ δ ≥ ρ
D − ρD
ρD
, (55)
which leads to the first expression in the theorem. Moreover,
from equation (39) we know that the following must hold:
∀σ s.t. xi = C : 0 ≤ φρC(σ) ≤ δ ⇒ 0 ≤ φρC(z, w˜z) ≤ δ.
(56)
Because φ > 0 it follows that ρC(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ such
that xi = C. Let us now consider the special case in which
φρC(z, w˜z) = 0. Then, equation (56) is satisfied for any φ >
0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Now suppose ρC(z, w˜z) > 0. Then, (56)
and (54) imply that in order for the generous strategy to be
enforceable it is necessary that
1− δ
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ φ ≤ δ
ρC(z, w˜z)
. (57)
Such a φ exists if and only if
1− δ
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ δ
ρC(z, w˜z)
ρD, ρC>0
======⇒ δ ≥ ρ
C
ρD + ρC
. (58)
This completes the proof. 
F. Proof of Theorem 4
For brevity, we refer to equations found in the proof of
Theorem 1. From (39) and (40) it follows that in order for
the payoff relation to be enforceable for any p0 ∈ (0, 1) it
must hold that for all σ such that xi = C, ρC(σ) > 0, and
for all σ such that xi = D, ρD(σ) > 0. For the existence of
equalizer strategies this must also hold for the special case in
which s = 0. Hence, we can rewrite (39) and (40) to obtain
the following set of inequalities
(1− δ)(1− p0)
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤φ ≤ 1− (1− δ)p0
ρC(z, w˜z)
, (59)
(1− δ)p0
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ φ ≤ δ + (1− δ)p0
ρD(z, w˜z)
. (60)
There exists such a φ > 0 if and only if the following
inequalities are satisfied
(1− δ)p0
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ δ + (1− δ)p0
ρD(z, w˜z)
, (61)
(1− δ)p0
ρD(z, wˆz)
≤ 1− (1− δ)p0
ρC(z, w˜z)
, (62)
(1− δ)(1− p0)
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ 1− (1− δ)p0
ρC(z, w˜z)
, (63)
(1− δ)(1− p0)
ρC(z, wˆz)
≤ δ + (1− δ)p0
ρD(z, w˜z)
. (64)
By collecting the terms in p0 and δ for (61)-(64) the conditions
can be derived as follows. The condition in (61) can be
satisfied if and only if
p0(1− δ)
(
ρD(z, w˜z)− ρD(z, wˆz)
) ≤ ρD(z, wˆz)δ.
In the special case that ρD(z, w˜z) − ρD(z, wˆz) = 0, this is
satisfied for every p0 ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1). On the other
hand, if ρD(z, w˜z) − ρD(z, wˆz) > 0, then the inequality can
be satisfied for every p0 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if (12) holds.
Likewise, (63) can be satisfied if and only if
−p0(1− δ)
(
ρC − ρC) ≤ ρC − (1− δ)ρC .
If ρC−ρC = 0, this inequality is satisfied for every p0 ∈ (0, 1).
On the other hand, if ρC − ρC > 0, the inequality is satisfied
if and only if the condition in (14) holds. (62) holds if and
only if the condition in (15) holds. Finally, (64) holds if and
only if the condition in (13) holds.
VIII. APPLICATION TO THE LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAME
In this section we apply the theory developed in this paper
to the linear public goods game in Example 1. The weights are
assumed to be equal, that is wj = 1n−1 for all j 6= i. In this
case, the conditions for existence and the thresholds become
relatively easy to solve. The proofs of this section are found
in the Appendices.
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(a) Threshold discount factors for generous and extortionate
strategies in the public goods game. Extortionate and generous
strategies can exist for slopes s beyond the first vertical line.
Beyond the second vertical line the payoff relation is enforceable
independent of n > 2. The horizontal line at 1
2
indicates the point
at which the expected number of rounds is two.
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(b) Values of functions that determine thresholds for generous strategies
in the public goods game, see equation (67). Extortionate and generous
strategies exist only after the vertical line.
Fig. 1: Numerical application to the n-player linear public goods game with parameter values are c = 1, r = 2, n = 5.
A. The existence problem for the linear public goods game
We first apply Theorem 1 to the linear public goods game
to characterize the enforceable slopes and baseline payoffs.
Consider the following conditions on the slope and baseline
payoff of the linear relation.
Proposition 5 (Existence of extortionate strategies). Suppose
p0 = 0, l = 0 and 0 < s < 1. For a public goods game with
r > 1, every slope s ≥ r−1r can be enforced independent of
n. If s < r−1r , the slope can be enforced if and only if
n ≤ r(1− s)
r(1− s)− 1 .
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 6 (Existence of generous strategies). Suppose
p0 = 1, l = rc− c and 0 < s < 1. For a public goods game
with 1 < r < n, the region of enforceable slopes of generous
strategies is equivalent to the region of the enforceable slopes
for extortionate strategies.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix B.
For the linear public goods game, the set of enforceable
slopes for extortionate and generous strategies are equivalent.
In general, however, the sets of enforceable slopes differ
between the classes of ZD strategies.
B. Threshold discount factors in the linear public goods game
Let us now examine the threshold discount factors of
extortionate strategies such that l = 0 and 0 < s < 1. In this
case the parameters in equation (11) result from the extreme
points of the functions
ρCe (z) := (1− s)(
rc(z + 1)
n
− c) + n− z − 1
n− 1 c, (65)
ρDe (z) := −(1− s)(
rcz
n
) +
z
n− 1c. (66)
From Proposition 5 we know that if − 1n−1 < s ≤ 1− nr(n−1)
no extortionate strategies can exist. Therefore, suppose that
the slope is sufficiently large, i.e. s ≥ 1 − nr(n−1) . Then, the
extreme points of ρCe (z) and ρ
D
e (z) are determined as
ρCe = ρ
C
e (0), ρ
C
e
= ρCe (n− 1),
ρDe = ρ
D
e (n− 1), ρDe = ρDe (0).
(67)
In the public goods game, next to the region of enforceable
slopes, also the threshold discount factors for generous and
extortionate strategies are equivalent, as highlighted in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Thresholds for extortion and generosity). For
the enforceable slopes s ≥ 1 − nr(n−1) , in the public goods
game the threshold discount factor for extortionate and gen-
erous strategies is determined as
δτ =
1− (1− s)(r − rn )
1− (1− s)(1− rn )
. (68)
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix C.
A numerical example of threshold discount factors for extor-
tionate and generous strategies in the linear public goods game
is shown in Figure 1(a). The figures represent the values of the
fractions in the expression for δτ in Theorem 2 and Theorem
3 using the extreme points of the functions in equations (65),
(66). The threshold discount factor for a particular slope s can
be determined from Figure 1(a) by looking at the value of the
solid red line at s. Different colors correspond to expressions
that are dominant before and after the critical existence point
s = 1− nr(n−1) = 3/8 that is indicated by the first vertical line.
This critical value of s indicates the point at which the maxima
and minima over z of ρCe (z) and ρ
D
e (z) are as in equation (67).
For the existence of generous and extortionate strategies, this
is a crucial point, namely, beyond this point and up to s < 1 all
the functions ρCe (z) and ρ
D
e (z) in equations (65) and (66) (and
those of generous strategies) are non-negative as can be seen
from the vertical line in Figure 1(b). An equivalent requirement
is formulated in Proposition 5 that states that for any slope
s < r−1r for existence of extortionate and generous strategies
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it is necessary that n ≤ r(1−s)r(1−s)−1 . Before the critical point,
this requirement cannot be satisfied and hence no generous
or extortionate strategies with such slopes can exist in the
linear public goods game. The second vertical line indicated
in Figure 1 indicates the point s = r−1r = 1/2, after which
any slope can be enforced independent of n, as formulated in
Proposition 5.
IX. FINAL REMARKS
We have extended the existing results for ZD strategies in
finitely repeated two-player two-action games to n-player two-
action games. We focused on n-player social dilemma games
because of their importance to the current literature. However,
the fundamental relation between the memory-one strategy
and the limit distribution is independent of the structure of
the game and thus the results in this paper can be extended
by considering n-player games that are not social dilemmas.
Our theory supports the finding that due to the finite number
of expected rounds or discounting of the payoffs, the initial
probability to cooperate of the key player remains important,
and we have shown that for the existence of generous strategies
the key player must start to cooperate with probability one.
Likewise, for extortionate strategies this initial probability
must be zero. Based on these necessary conditions on the
initial probability to cooperate we derived expressions for the
minimum discount factors above which a ZD strategist can
enforce some desired generous or extortionate payoff relation.
Because equalizer strategies do not impose such conditions
on the initial probability to cooperate, one can identify a
multitude of p0 regions in the unit interval for which there
exist different threshold discount factors. Consequently, we
have derived an expression that ensures the desired equalizer
strategy is enforceable for any initial probability to cooperate
in the open unit interval. The derived necessary and sufficient
conditions for existence and the thresholds discount factors
presented in this paper may be helpful in designing novel
control techniques for repeated decision making processes.
Furthermore, our results can aid the design of human exper-
iments that aim to test the level of control a decision maker
can have in a real life setting.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Let us first formulate the following Lemma that character-
izes the enforceable baseline payoffs in the linear public goods
game.
Lemma 2 (Enforceable baseline payoffs). For the public
goods game the enforceable baseline payoffs are determined
by
max
{
0,
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s
}
≤ l, (69)
min
{
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s , rc− c
}
≥ l, (70)
with at least one strict inequality.
Proof: The bounds are obtained by substituting the single-
round payoffs az and bz of Example 1 into the inequalities of
Theorem 1 and use the fact that the bounds are linear in z.
The obvious details are omitted.
We now continue to prove Proposition 5. For extortionate
strategies l = 0 and 0 < s < 1. The inequalities in equations
(69) and (70) in Lemma 2 become
max
{
0,
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s
}
≤ 0 (71)
min
{
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s , rc− c
}
≥ 0 (72)
Solving for s will yield the enforceable slopes in the extor-
tionate ZD strategy. Observe that a necessary condition for
equation (71) to hold is that the left hand side is equal to 0
and in order for this to hold it is required that
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s ≤ 0⇔ rc(n− 1)− n
c
1− s ≤ 0. (73)
Equivalently,
n(r − 1
1− s ) ≤ r ⇔ n(r(1− s)− 1) ≤ r(1− s). (74)
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The conditions − 1n−1 < s < 1 in Theorem 1 and the
assumption that r is positive implies that r(1−s) in the right-
hand side of equation (74) is required to be strictly positive.
It follows that if r(1− s)− 1 ≤ 0 the inequalities in equation
(73) are always satisfied. To obtain the criteria on the slope s
we may write,
r(1− s)− 1 ≤ 0⇔ −rs ≤ 1− r ⇔ s ≥ r − 1
r
. (75)
Note that if s ≥ r−1r is satisfied, the left-hand side of the
inequality in equation (72) reads as rc − c. The requirement
0 ≤ rc− c leads to r ≥ 1, which is very natural and satisfied
for the payoff of the public goods game. It follows that for
every r > 1, every s ≥ r−1r can be enforced independent of
n.
On the other hand, when s < r−1r in order for equation (73)
to be satisfied it must hold that
n ≤ r(1− s)
r(1− s)− 1 . (76)
Note that s < r−1r implies r(1 − s) − 1 6= 0 so the above
inequality in well-defined. If (76) does not hold and s < r−1r
than
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s > 0, (77)
thus the lower-bound in equation (71) is not satisfied and
consequently there cannot exist extortionate strategies. We
now investigate the inequality in equation (72). We already
know that when s ≥ r−1r the upper-bound reads as 0 < rc− c
and is satisfied for any r > 1. On the other hand, the left-hand
side of equation (72) is equal to rcn − c+ c1−s if
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s ≤ rc− c⇔ n[(1− s)r − 1] ≥ r(1− s).
Because r(1− s) > 0, these inequalities can only be satisfied
if s < r−1r and
n ≥ r(1− s)
r(1− s)− 1 . (78)
Note that the only possibility for an enforceable payoff rela-
tion is the equality case in which n = r(1−s)(1−s)r−1 , otherwise the
lower-bound is not satisfied and there cannot exist extortionate
strategies.
Finally, we check the necessary condition for the existence
of solutions of equations (71) and (72) that the lower-bound
cannot exceed the upper-bound. We already know that when
s ≥ r−1r the lower and upper-bound read as 0 ≤ 0 ≤ rc − c
and is satisfied for any r > 1. When s < r−1r for existence,
n cannot exceed r(1−s)r(1−s)−1 . When equality holds note that we
have
if n =
r(1− s)
r(1− s)− 1 and s <
r − 1
r
:
0 =
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s ≤ 0 ≤
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s = rc− c,
which is satisfied with a strict upper-bound if r > 1. We
conclude that the lower-bound never exceeds the upper-bound
and this condition does not limit the existence of extortionate
ZD strategies in the public goods game. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
For generous strategies l = rc − c and 0 < s < 1, the
inequalities in equations (69) and (70) in Lemma 2 become
max
{
0,
rc(n− 1)
n
− c
1− s
}
≤ rc− c, (79)
min
{
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s , rc− c
}
≥ rc− c. (80)
Clearly in order for generous strategies to exist it is neces-
sary that the left hand side of equation (80) reads as rc − c.
Therefore it is required that
rc
n
− c+ c
1− s ≥ rc− c⇔ n(r(1− s)− 1) ≤ (1− s)r.
Hence, this condition is equivalent to the condition in equation
(74) and thus this condition gives the same feasible region
for the existence of extortionate strategies. Now suppose that,
s < r−1r and n ≥ r(1−s)r(1−s)−1 . Also in this case, only equality is
possible i.e. n = r(1−s)r(1−s)−1 because otherwise the upper-bound
is not satisfied. Next to this, if s < r−1r and n =
r(1−s)
r(1−s)−1 in
order for the lower-bound to be satisfied it is required that
rc− c = rc
n
− c+ c
1− s ≥ rc− c ≥= 0,
which is satisfied with a strict lower-bound for any r > 1.
We conclude that, in the linear public goods game, the region
of feasible slopes for generous strategies is equivalent to the
region of feasible sloped for extortionate strategies. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
For the linear public goods game the parameters in equation
(11) can be obtained from the extrema of the following
functions
ρC(z) = (1− s)(rc(z + 1)
n
− c− l) + n− z − 1
n− 1 c,
ρD(z) = (1− s)(l − rcz
n
) +
z
n− 1c
(81)
We focus first on the case in which l = 0 and 0 < s < 1, and
thus the strategy is extortionate. In this case the equations in
(81) become
ρCe (z) := (1− s)(
rc(z + 1)
n
− c) + n− z − 1
n− 1 c (82)
ρDe (z) := −(1− s)(
rcz
n
) +
z
n− 1c (83)
We continue to obtain the maximizers and minimizers of equa-
tion (65), that because of linearity in z can only occur at the
extreme points z = 0 and z = n− 1. When n > r and r > 1,
as is the case when the linear public goods game is a social
dilemma, we have the following simple conditions on the slope
of the extortionate strategy. If − 1n−1 < s ≤ 1 − nr(n−1) no
extortionate or generous strategies can exist. Hence assume
s ≥ 1− nr(n−1) . Then,
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ρCe = ρ
C
e (0) = (1− s)(
rc
n
− c) + c,
ρC
e
= ρCe (n− 1) = (1− s)(rc− c) > 0,
ρDe = ρ
D
e (n− 1) = −(1− s)(
rc(n− 1)
n
) + c,
ρD
e
= ρDe (0) = 0.
(84)
The fractions in Proposition 2 become
ρDe
ρDe + ρ
C
e
=
ρCe − ρCe
ρCe
=
(1− s)( rn − r) + 1
(1− s)( rn − 1) + 1
. (85)
We focus now on the case in which l = rc− c and 0 < s < 1,
and hence the strategy is generous. If l = rc− c the equations
in (81) become
ρCg (z) := (1− s)(
rc(z + 1)
n
− rc) + n− z − 1
n− 1 c
ρDg (z) := (1− s)(rc− c−
rcz
n
) +
z
n− 1c
(86)
The extreme points of these functions read as
ρCg = ρ
C
g (0) = ρ
D
e ,
ρC
g
= ρCg (n− 1) = ρDe ,
ρDg = ρ
D
g (n− 1) = ρCe ,
ρD
g
= ρDg (0) = ρ
C
e
.
(87)
It follows that the fractions in Theorem 3 are equivalent to
those in Theorem 2. 
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